The evolution and policy implications of Phillips curve analysis by Thomas M. Humphrey
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Thomas  M.  Humphrey 
At  the  core  of  modern  macroeconomics  is  some 
version  or  another  of  the  famous  Phillips  curve  rela- 
tionship  between  inflation  and  unemployment.  The 
Phillips  curve,  both  in  its  original  and  more  recently 
reformulated  expectations-augmented  versions,  has 
two  main  uses.  In  theoretical  models  of  inflation,  it 
provides  the  so-called  “missing  equation”  that  ex- 
plains  how  changes  in  nominal  income  divide  them- 
selves  into  price  and  quantity  components.  On  the 
policy  front,  it  specifies  conditions  contributing  to 
the  effectiveness  (or  lack  thereof)  of  expansionary 
and  disinflationary  policies.  For  example,  in  its 
expectations-augmented  form,  it  predicts  that  the 
power  of  expansionary  measures  to  stimulate  real 
activity  depends  critically  upon  how  price  anticipa- 
tions  are  formed.  Similarly,  it  predicts  that  disinfla- 
tionary  policy  will  either  work  slowly  (and  painfully) 
or  swiftly  (and  painlessly)  depending  upon  the  speed 
of  adjustment  of  price  expectations.  In  fact,  few 
macro  policy  questions  are  discussed  without  at  least 
some  reference  to  an  analytical  framework  that  might 
be  described  in  terms  of  some  version  of  the  Phillips 
curve. 
As  might  be  expected  from  such  a widely  used  tool, 
Phillips  curve  analysis  has  hardly  stood  still  since  its 
beginnings  in  1958.  Rather  it  has  evolved  under  the 
pressure  of  events  and  the  progress  of  economic 
theorizing,  incorporating  at  each  stage  such  new 
elements  as  the  natural  rate  hypothesis,  the  adaptive- 
expectations  mechanism,  and  most  recently,  the  ra- 
tional  expectations  hypothesis.  Each  new  element 
expanded  its  explanatory  power.  Each  radically 
altered  its  policy  implications.  As  a  result,  whereas 
the  Phillips  curve  was  once  seen  as  offering  a  stable 
enduring  trade-off  for  the  policymakers  to  exploit, 
it  is  now  widely  viewed  as  offering  no  trade-off  at  all. 
In  short,  the  original  Phillips  curve  notion  of  the 
potency  of  activist  fine  tuning  has  given  way  to  the 
revised  Phillips  curve  notion  of policy  ineffectiveness. 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  trace  the  sequence  of 
steps  that  led  to  this  change.  Accordingly,  the  para- 
graphs  below  sketch  the  evolution  of  Phillips  curve 
analysis,  emphasizing  in  particular  the  theoretical 
innovations  incorporated  into  that  analysis  at  each 
stage  and  the  policy  implications  of  each  innovation. 
I. 
EARLY  VERSIONS  OF  THE  PHILLIPS  CURVE 
The  idea  of  an  inflation-unemployment  trade-off  is 
hardly  new.  It  was  a key  component  of  the  monetary 
doctrines  of  David  Hume  (1752)  and  Henry  Thorn- 
ton  (1802).  It  was  identified  statistically  by  Irving 
Fisher  in  1926,  although  he  viewed  causation  as 
running  from  inflation  to  unemployment  rather  than 
vice  versa.  It  was  stated  in  the  form  of  an  econo- 
metric  equation  by  Jan  Tinbergen  in  1936 and  again 
by  Lawrence  Klein  and  Arthur  Goldberger  in  1955. 
Finally,  it  was  graphed  on  a scatterplot  chart  by  A.  J. 
Brown  in  1955  and  presented  in  the  form  of  a  dia- 
grammatic  curve  by  Paul  Sultan  in  1957.  Despite 
these  early  efforts,  however,  it  was  not  until  1958 
that  modern  Phillips  curve  analysis  can  be  said  to 
have  begun.  That  year  saw  the  publication  of  Pro- 
fessor  A.  W.  Phillips’  famous  article  in  which  he 
fitted  a  statistical  equation  w=f(U)  to  annual  data 
on  percentage  rates  of  change  of  money  wages  (w) 
and  the  unemployment  rate  (U)  in  the  United  King- 
dom  for  the  period  1861-1913.  The  result,  shown 
in  a chart  like  Figure  1 with  wage  inflation  measured 
vertically  and  unemployment  horizontally,  was  a 
smooth,  downward-sloping  convex  curve  that  cut  the 
horizontal  axis  at  a  positive  level  of  unemployment. 
The  curve  itself  was  given  a  straightforward  inter- 
pretation:  it  showed  the  response  of  wages  to  the 
excess  demand  for  labor  as  proxied  by  the  inverse  of 
the  unemployment  rate.  Low  unemployment  spelled 
high  excess  demand  and  thus  upward  pressure  on 
wages.  The  greater  this  excess  labor  demand  the 
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EARLY  PHILLIPS  CURVE 
w  Wage  Inflation  Rate  (%) 
Inflation  and  Unemployment 
Phillips  Curve  Trade-off 
Relationship  Between 
Unemployment 
At  unemployment  rate  Uf  the  labor  market 
is  in  equilibrium  and  wages  are  stable.  At 
lower  unemployment  rates  excess  demand 
exists  to  bid  up  wages.  At  higher  unemploy- 
ment  rates  excess  supply  exists  to  bid  down 
wages.  The  curve’s  convex  shape  shows  that 
increasing  excess  demand  for  labor  runs  into 
diminishing  marginal  returns  in reducing  un- 
employment.  Thus  successive  uniform  de 
creases  in  unemployment  (horizontal  gray 
arrows)  require  progressively  larger  increases 
in  excess  demand  and  hence  wage  inflation 
rates  (vertical  black  arrows)  as  we  go  from 
point  a  to  b to  c  to  d along  the  curve. 
faster  the  rise  in  wages.  Similarly,  high  unemploy- 
ment  spelled  negative  excess  demand  (i.e.,  excess 
labor  supply)  that  put  deflationary  pressure  on 
wages.  Since  the  rate  of  change  of  wages  varied 
directly  with  excess  demand,  which  in  turn  varied 
inversely  with  unemployment,  wage  inflation  would 
rise  with  decreasing  unemployment  and  fall  with 
increasing  unemployment  as  indicated  by  the  negative 
slope  of  the  curve.  Moreover,  owing  to  unavoidable 
frictions  in  the  operation  of  the  labor  market,  it 
followed  that  some  frictional  unemployment  would 
exist  even  when  the  market  was  in  equilibrium,  that 
is,  when  excess  labor  demand  was  zero  and  wages 
were  stable.  Accordingly,  this  frictional  unemploy- 
ment  was  indicated  by  the  point  at  which  the  Phillips 
curve  crosses  the  horizontal  axis.  According  to 
Phillips,  this  is  also  the  point  to  which  the  economy 
returns  if  the  authorities  ceased  to  maintain  dis- 
equilibrium  in  the  labor  market  by  pegging  the  excess 
demand  for  labor.  Finally,  since  increases  in  excess 
demand  would  likely  run  into  diminishing  marginal 
returns  in  reducing  unemployment,  it  followed  that 
the  curve  must  be  convex-this  convexity  showing 
that  successive  uniform  decrements  in  unemployment 
would  require  progressively  larger  increments  in 
excess  demand  (and  thus  wage  inflation  rates)  to 
achieve  them. 
Popularity  of  the  Phillips  Paradigm 
Once  equipped  with  the  foregoing  theoretical  foun- 
dations,  the  Phillips  curve  gained  swift  acceptance 
among  economists  and  policymakers  alike.  It  is 
important  to  understand  why  this  was  so.  At  least 
three  factors  probably  contributed  to  the  attractive- 
ness  of  the  Phillips  curve.  One  was  the  remarkable 
temporal  stability  of  the  relationship,  a  stability  re- 
vealed  by  Phillips’  own  finding  that  the  same  curve 
estimated  for  the  pre-World  War  I  period  1861-1913 
fitted  the  United  Kingdom  data  for  the  post-World 
War  II  period  1948-1957  equally  well  or  even  better. 
Such  apparent  stability  in  a  two-variable  relationship 
over  such  a  long  period  of  time  is  uncommon  in 
empirical  economics  and  served  to  excite  interest  in 
the  curve. 
A  second  factor  contributing  to  the  success  of  the 
Phillips  curve  was  its  ability  to  accommodate  a  wide 
variety  of  inflation  theories.  The  Phillips  curve 
itself  explained  inflation  as  resulting  from  excess 
demand  that  bids  up  wages  and  prices.  It  was  en- 
tirely  neutral,  however,  about  the  causes  of  that 
phenomenon.  Now  excess  demand  can  of  course  be 
generated  either  by  shifts  in  demand  or  shifts  in 
supply  regardless  of  the  causes  of  those  shifts. 
Thus  a  demand-pull  theorist  could  argue  that  excess- 
demand-induced  inflation  stems  from  excessively 
expansionary  aggregate  demand  policies  while  a cost- 
push  theorist  could  claim  that  it  emanates  from  trade- 
union  monopoly  power  and  real  shocks  operating  on 
labor  supply.  The  Phillips  curve  could  accommodate 
both  views.  Economists  of  rival  schools  could  accept 
the  Phillips  curve  as  offering  insights  into  the  nature 
of  the  inflationary  process  even  while  disagreeing  on 
the  causes  of  and  appropriate  remedies  for  inflation. 
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makers  because  it  provided  a  convincing  rationale  for 
their  apparent  failure  to  achieve  full  employment 
with  price  stability-twin  goals  that  were  thought  to 
be  mutually  compatible  before  Phillips’  analysis. 
When  criticized  for  failing  to  achieve  both  goals 
simultaneously,  the  authorities  could  point  to  the 
Phillips  curve  as  showing  that  such  an  outcome  was 
impossible  and  that  the  best  one  could  hope  for  was 
either  arbitrarily  low  unemployment  or  price  stability 
but  not  both.  Note  also  that  the  curve,  by  offering  a 
menu  of  alternative  inflation-unemployment  combi- 
nations  from  which  the  authorities  could  choose, 
provided  a  ready-made  justification  for  discretionary 
intervention  and  activist  fine  tuning.  Policymakers 
had  but  to  select  the  best  (or  least  undesirable) 
combination  on  the  menu  and  then  use  their  policy 
instruments  to  achieve  it.  For  this  reason  too  the 
curve  must  have  appealed  to  some  policy  authorities, 
not  to  mention  the  economic  advisors  who  supplied 
the  cost-benefit  analysis  underlying  their  choices. 
From  Wage-Change  Relation  to 
Price-Change  Relation 
As  noted  above,  the  initial  Phillips  curve  depicted  a 
relation  between  unemployment  and  wage  inflation. 
Policymakers,  however,  usually  specify  inflation  tar- 
gets  in  terms  of  rates  of  change  of  prices  rather  than 
wages.  Accordingly,  to  make  the  Phillips  curve  more 
useful  to  policymakers,  it  was  therefore  necessary  to 
transform  it  from  a  wage-change  relationship  to  a 
price-change  relationship.  This  transformation  was 
achieved  by  assuming  that  prices  are  set  by  apply- 
ing  a constant  mark-up  to  unit  labor  cost  and  so  move 
in  step  with  wages-or,  more  precisely,  move  at  a 
rate  equal  to  the  differential  between  the  percentage 
rates  of growth  of  wages  and  productivity  (the  latter 
assumed  zero  here).l  The  result  of  this  transforma- 
tion  was  the  price-change  Phillips  relation 
1 Let  prices  P  be  the  product  of  a  fixed  markup  K  (in- 
cluding  normal  profit  margin  and  provision  for  depreci- 
ation)  applied  to  unit  labor  costs  C, 
(1)  P  =  KC. 
Unit  labor  costs  by  definition  are  the  ratio  of  hourly 
wages  W  to  labor  productivity  or  output  per  labor  hour 
Q 
(2)  C  =  W/Q. 
Substituting  (2)  into  (l),  taking  logarithms  of  both  sides 
of  the  resulting  expression,  and  then  differentiating  with 
respect  to  time  yields 
(3)  P  =  w  -  q 
where  the  lower  case  letters  denote  the  percentage  rates 
of  change  of  the  price,  wage,  and  productivity  variables. 
Assuming  productivity  growth  q  is  zero  and the  rate  of 
wage  change  w  is  an  inverse  function  of  the  unemploy- 
ment  rate  yields  equation  (1)  of  the  text. 
(1)  P  =  ax(U) 
where  p  is  the  rate  of price  inflation,  x(U)  is  overall 
excess  demand  in  labor  and  hence  product  markets- 
this  excess  demand  being  an  inverse  function  of  the 
unemployment  rate-and  a  is  a  price-reaction  coeffi- 
cient  expressing  the  response  of  inflation  to  excess 
demand.  From  this  equation  the  authorities  could 
determine  how  much  unemployment  would  be  asso- 
ciated  with  any  given  target  rate  of  inflation.  They 
could  also  use  it  to  measure  the  effect  of  policies 
undertaken  to  obtain  a more  favorable  Phillips  curve, 
i.e.,  policies  aimed  at  lowering  the  price-response 
coefficient  and  the  amount  of  unemployment  associ- 
ated  with  any  given  level  of  excess  demand. 
Trade-Offs  and  Attainable  Combinations 
The  foregoing  equation  specifies  the  position  (or 
distance,  from  origin)  and  slope  of  the  Phillips  curve 
-two  features  stressed  in  policy  discussions  of  the 
early  1960s.  As  seen  by  the  policymakers  of that  era, 
the  curve’s  position  fixes  the  inner  boundary,  or 
frontier,  of  feasible  (attainable)  combinations  of 
inflation  and  unemployment  rates  (see  Figure  2). 
Determined  by  the  structure  of  labor  and  product 
markets,  the  position  of  the  curve  defines  the  set  of 
all  coordinates  of  inflation  and  unemployment  rates 
the  authorities  could  achieve  via  implementation  of 
monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  Using  these  macroeco- 
nomic  demand-management  policies  the  authorities 
could  put  the  economy  anywhere  on  the  curve.  They 
could  not,  however,  operate  to  the  left  of  it.  The 
Phillips  curve  was  viewed  as  a  constraint  preventing 
them  from  achieving  still  lower  levels  of both  inflation 
and  unemployment.  Given  the  structure  of  labor  and 
product  markets,  it  would  be  impossible  for  mone- 
tary  and  fiscal  policy  alone  to  reach  inflation- 
unemployment  combinations  in  the  region  to  the  left 
of  the  curve. 
The  slope  of  the  curve  was  interpreted  as  showing 
the  relevant  policy  trade-offs  (rates  of  exchange 
between  policy  goals)  available  to  the  authorities.  As 
explained  in  early  Phillips  curve  analysis,  these 
trade-offs  arise  because  of  the  existence  of  irrecon- 
cilable  conflicts  among  policy  objectives.  When  the 
goals  of  full  employment  and  price  stability  are  not 
simultaneously  achievable,  then  attempts  to  move  the 
economy  closer  to  one  will  necessarily  move  it  further 
away  from  the  other.  The  rate  at  which  one  objective 
must  be  given  up  to  obtain  a  little  bit  more  of  the 
other  is  measured  by  the  slope  of  the  Phillips  curve. 
For  example,  when  the  Phillips  curve  is  steeply 
sloped,  it  means  that  a  small  reduction  in  unemploy- 
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TRADE-OFFS  AND 
ATTAINABLE  COMBINATIONS 
p  Price  Inflation  Rate  (%) 
The  position  or  location  of  the  Phillips 
curve  defines  the  frontier  or  set  of 
attainable  inflation-unemployment  combi- 
nations.  Using  monetary  and  fiscal  policies, 
the  authorities  can  attain  all  combinations 
lying  upon  the  frontier  itself  but  none  in 
the  shaded  region  below  it.  In  this  way  the 
curve  acts  as  a  constraint  on  demand- 
management  policy  choices.  The  slope 
of  the  curve  shows  the  trade-offs  or  rates 
of  exchange  between  the  two  evils  of 
inflation  and  unemployment. 
ment  would  be  purchased  at  the  cost  of  a  large  in- 
crease  in  the  rate  of  inflation.  Conversely,  in  rela- 
tively  flat  portions  of  the  curve,  considerably  lower 
unemployment  could  be  obtained  fairly  cheaply,  that 
is  at  the.  cost  of  only  slight  increases  in  inflation. 
Knowledge  of  these  trade-offs,  would  enable  the 
authorities  to,  determine  the  price-stability  sacrifice 
necessary  to  buy  any  given  reduction  in  the  unem- 
ployment  rate. 
The  Best  Selection  on  the  Phillips  Frontier 
The  preceding  has  described  the  early  view  of  the 
Phillips  curve  as  a  stable,  enduring.  trade-off  per- 
mitting  the  authorities  to  obtain  permanently  lower 
rates  of  unemployment  in  exchange  for  permanently 
higher  rates  of  inflation  or  vice  versa.  Put  differ- 
ently,  the  curve  was  interpreted  as  offering  a  menu 
of  alternative  inflation-unemployment  combinations 
from  which  the  authorities  could  choose.  Given  the 
menu,  the  authorities’  task  was  to  select  the  particular 
inflation-unemployment  mix  resulting  in  the  smallest 
social  cost  (see  Figure  3).  To  do  this,  they  would 
have  to  assign  relative  weights  to  the  twin  evils  of 
The  bowed-out  curves  are  social  disutility 
contours.  Each  contour  shows  all  the  com- 
binations  of  inflation  and  unemployment 
resulting  in  a  given  level  of  social cost or 
harm.  The  closer  to  the  origin,  the  lower 
the  social  cost.  The  slopes  of  these  contours 
reflect  the  relative  weights  that  society  (or 
the  policy  authority)  assigns  to  the  evils  of 
inflation  and  unemployment.  The  best 
combination  of  inflation  and  unemploy- 
ment  that  the  policymakers  can  reach,  given 
the  Phillips  curve  constraint,  is  the  mix 
appearing  on  the  lowest  attainable  social 
disutility  contour.  Here  the  additional 
social  benefit  from  a  unit  reduction  in 
unemployment  will  just  be  worth  the 
extra  inflation  cost  of  doing  so. 
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views  of the  comparative  harm  caused  by  each.  Then, 
using  monetary  and  fiscal  policy,  they  would  move 
along  the  Phillips  curve,  trading  off  unemployment 
for  inflation  (or  vice  versa)  until  they  reached  the 
point  at  which  the  additional  benefit  from  a  further 
reduction  in  unemployment  was  just  worth  the  extra 
inflation  cost  of  doing  so.  Here  would  be  the  opti- 
mum,  or  least  undesirable,  mix  of inflation  and  unem- 
ployment.  At  this  point  the  economy  would  be  on  its 
lowest  attainable  social  disutility  contour  (the  bowed- 
out  curves  radiating  outward  from  the  origin  of 
Figure  3)  allowed  by  the  Phillips  curve  constraint. 
Here  the  unemployment-inflation  combination  chosen 
would  be  the  one  that  minimized  social  harm.  It  was 
of  course  understood  that  if  this  outcome  involved  a 
positive  rate  of  inflation,  continuous  excess  money 
growth  would  be  required  to  maintain  it.  For  without 
such  monetary  stimulus,  excess  demand  would  dis- 
appear  and  the  economy  would  return  to  the  point 
at  which  the  Phillips  curve  crosses  the  horizontal 
axis. 
Different  Preferences,  Different  Outcomes 
It  was  also  recognized  that  policymakers  might 
differ  in  their  assessment  of  the  comparative  social 
cost  of  inflation  vs.  unemployment  and  thus  assign 
different  policy  weights  to  each.  Policymakers  who 
believed  that  unemployment  was  more  undesirable 
than  rising  prices  would  assign  a much  higher  relative 
weight  to  the  former  than  would  policymakers  who 
judged  inflation  to  be  the  worse  evil.  Hence,  those 
with  a  marked  aversion  to  unemployment  would 
prefer  a  point  higher  up  on  the  Phillips  curve  than 
would  those  more  anxious  to  avoid  inflation,  as  shown 
in  Figure  4.  Whereas  one  political  administration 
might  opt  for  a  high  pressure  economy  on  the 
grounds  that  the  social  benefits  of  low  unemployment 
exceeded  the  harm  done  by  the  inflation  necessary  to 
achieve  it,  another  administration  might  deliberately 
aim  for  a  low  pressure  economy  because  it  believed 
that  some  economic  slack  was  a  relatively  painless 
means  of  eradicating  harmful  inflation.  Both  groups 
would  of course  prefer  combinations  to  the  southwest 
of  the  Phillips  constraint,  down  closer  to  the  figure’s 
origin  (the  ideal  point  of  zero  inflation  and  zero  un- 
employment).  As  pointed  out  before,  however,  this 
would  be  impossible  given  the  structure  of  the  econ- 
omy,  which  determines  the  position  or  location  of  the 
Phillips  frontier.  In  short,  the  policymakers  would 
be  constrained  to  combinations  lying  on  this  bound- 
ary,  unless  they  were  prepared  to  alter  the  economy’s 
structure. 
Different  political  administrations  may 
differ  in  their  evaluations  of  the  social 
harmfulness  of  inflation  relative  to  that  of 
unemployment.  Thus  in  their  policy  delib 
erations  they  will  attach  different  relative 
weights  to  the  two  evils  of  inflation  and  un- 
employment.  These  weights  will  be  re- 
flected  in  the  slopes  of  the  social  disutility 
contours  (as  those  contours  are  interpreted 
by  the  policymakers).  The  relatively  flat 
contours  reflect  the  views  of  those  attaching 
higher  relative  weight  to  the  evils  of  infla- 
tion;  the  steep  contours  to  those  assigning 
higher  weight  to  unemployment.  An  unem- 
ployment-averse  administration  will  choose 
a  point  on  the  Phillips  curve  involving  more 
inflation  and  less  unemployment  than  the 
combination  selected  by  an  inflation-averse 
administration. 
Pessimistic  Phillips  Curve  and  the 
“Cruel  Dilemma” 
In  the  early  1960s  there  was  much  discussion  of 
the  so-called  “cruel-dilemma”  problem  imposed  by  an 
unfavorable  Phillips  curve.  The  cruel  dilemma  refers 
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available  combinations  on  the  menu  of  policy  choices 
is  acceptable  to  the  majority  of  a  country’s  voters 
(see  Figure  5).  For  example,  suppose  there  is  some 
maximum  rate  of  inflation,  A,  that  voters  are  just 
willing  to  tolerate  without  removing  the  party  in 
power.  Likewise,  suppose  there  is  some  maximum 
tolerable  rate  of  unemployment,  B.  As  shown  in 
Figure  5, these  limits  define  the  zone  of  acceptable  or 
politically  feasible  combinations  of  inflation  and 
unemployment.  A  Phillips  curve  that  occupies  a 
position  anywhere  within  this  zone  will  satisfy  soci- 
ety’s  demands  for  reasonable  price  stability  and  high 
employment.  But  if  both  limits  are  exceeded  and  the 
curve  lies  outside  the  region  of  satisfactory  outcomes, 
the  system’s  performance  will  fall  short  of  what  was 
expected  of  it,  and  the  resulting  discontent  may 
severely  aggravate  political  and  social  tensions. 
If,  as  some  analysts  alleged,  the  Phillips  curve 
tended  to  be  located  so  far  to  the  right  in  the  chart 
that  no  portion  of  it  fell  within  the  zone  of  acceptable 
combinations,  then  the  policymakers  would  indeed  be 
confronted  with  a  painful  dilemma.  At  best  they 
could  hold  only  one  of  the  variables,  inflation  or 
unemployment,  down  to  acceptable  levels.  But  they 
could  not  hold  both  simultaneously  within  the  limits 
of  toleration.  Faced  with  such  a  pessimistic  Phillips 
curve,  policymakers  armed  only  with  traditional 
demand-management  policies  would  find  it  impossible 
to  achieve  combinations  of  inflation  and  unemploy- 
ment  acceptable  to  society. 
Policies  to  Shift  the  Phillips  Curve 
It  was  this  concern  and  frustration  over  the  seem- 
ing  inability  of  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  to  resolve 
the  unemployment-inflation  dilemma  that  induced 
some  economists  in  the  early  1960s  to  urge  the  adop- 
tion  of  incomes  (wage-price)  and  structural  (labor- 
market)  policies.  Monetary  and  fiscal  policies  alone 
were  thought  to  be  insufficient  to  resolve  the  cruel 
dilemma  since  the  most  these  policies  could  do  was  to 
enable  the  economy  to  occupy  alternative  positions  on 
the  pessimistic  Phillips  curve.  That  is,  monetary 
and  fiscal  policies  could  move  the  economy  along  the 
given  curve,  but  they  could  not  move  the  curve  itself 
into  the  zone  of  tolerable  outcomes.  What  was 
needed,  it  was  argued,  were  new  policies  that  would 
twist  or  shift  the  Phillips  frontier  toward  the  origin 
of  the  diagram. 
Of  these  measures,  incomes  policies  would  be 
directed  at  the  price-response  coefficient  linking  infla- 
tion  to  excess  demand.  Either  by  decreeing  this 
Figure  5 
PESSIMISTIC  PHILLIPS  CURVE 
AND  THE  “CRUEL  DILEMMA” 
p  Price  Inflation  Rate 
Pessimistic  or  Unfavorable 
Phillips  Curve;  Lies 
Outside  the  Zone  of 
Tolerable  Outcomes 
Phillips  Curve 
Shifted  Down  by 
Incomes  and/or 
A  =  Maximum  Tolerable  Rate  of  Inflation 
B =  Maximum  Tolerable  Rate  of  Unemployment 
Given  the  unfavorable  Phillips  curve,  policy- 
makers  are  confronted  with  a  cruel  choice. 
They  can  achieve  acceptable  rates  of  infla- 
tion  (point  a)  or  unemployment  (point  b) 
but  not  both.  The  rationale  for incomes 
(wage-price)  and  structural  (labor  market) 
policies  was  to  shift  the  Phillips  curve  down 
into  the  zone  of  tolerable  outcomes. 
coefficient  to  be  zero  (as  with  wage-price  freezes), 
or  by  replacing  it  with  an  officially  mandated  rate  of 
price  increase,  or  simply  by  persuading  sellers  to 
moderate  their  wage  and  price  demands,  such  policies 
would  lower  the  rate  of  inflation  associated  with  any 
given  level  of  unemployment  and  thus  twist  down  the 
Phillips  curve.  The  idea  was  that  wage-price  controls 
would  hold  inflation  down  while  excess  demand  was 
being  used  to  boost  employment. 
Should  incomes  policies  prove  unworkable  or  pro- 
hibitively  expensive  in  terms  of  their  resource- 
misallocation  and  restriction-of-freedom  costs,  then 
the  authorities  could  rely  solely  on  microeconomic 
structural  policies  to  improve  the  trade-off.  By  en- 
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product  markets,  these  latter  policies  could  lower  the 
Phillips  curve  by  reducing  the  amount  of  unemploy- 
ment  associated  with  any  given  level  of  excess  de- 
mand.  Thus  the  rationale  for  such  measures  as  job- 
training  and  retraining  programs,  job-information 
and  job-counseling  services,  relocation  subsidies,  anti- 
discrimination  laws  and  the  like  was  to  shift  the 
Phillips  frontier  down  so  that  the  economy  could 
obtain  better  inflation-unemployment  combinations. 
II. 
INTRODUCTION  OF  SHIFT  VARIABLES 
Up  until  the  mid-1960s  the  Phillips  curve  received 
widespread  and  largely  uncritical  acceptance.  Few 
questioned  the  usefulness,  let  alone  the  existence,  of 
this  construct.  In  policy  discussions  as  well  as  eco- 
nomic  textbooks,  the  Phillips  curve  was  treated  as  a 
stable,  enduring  relationship  or  menu  of  policy 
choices.  Being  stable  (and  barring  the  application  of 
incomes  and  structural  policies),  the  menu  never 
changed. 
Empirical  studies  of  the  1900-1958  U.  S.  data  soon 
revealed,  however,  that  the  menu  for  this  country 
was  hardly  as  stable  as  its  original  British  counter- 
part  and  that  the  Phillips  curve  had  a  tendency  to 
shift  over  time.  Accordingly,  the  trade-off  equation 
was  augmented  with  additional  variables  to  account 
for  such  movements.  The  inclusion  of  these  shift 
variables  marked  the  second  stage  of  Phillips  curve 
analysis  and  meant  that  the  trade-off  equation  could 
be  written  as 
(2)  P  =  ax(U)+z 
where  z  is  a  vector  of  variables-productivity,  prof- 
its,  trade  union  effects,  unemployment  dispersion  and 
the  like-thought  capable  of  shifting  the  inflation- 
unemployment  trade-off. 
In  retrospect,  this  vector  or  list  was  deficient  both 
for  what  it  included  and  what  it  left  out.  Excluded 
at  this  stage  were  variables  representing  inflation 
expectations-later  shown  to  be  a  chief  cause  of  the 
shifting  short-run  Phillips  curve.  Of  the  variables 
included,  subsequent  analysis  would  reveal  that  at 
least  three-productivity,  profits,  and  measures  of 
union  monopoly  power-were  redundant  because 
they  constituted  underlying  determinants  of  the 
demand  for  and  supply  of  labor  and  as  such  were 
already  captured  by  the  excess  demand  variable,  U. 
This  criticism,  however,  did  not  apply  to  the  unem- 
ployment  dispersion  variable,  changes  in  which  were 
independent  of  excess  demand  and  were  indeed  capa- 
ble  of  causing  shifts  in  the  aggregate  Phillips  curve. 
To  explain  how  the  dispersion  of  unemployment 
across  separate  micro  labor  markets  could  affect  the 
aggregate  trade-off,  analysts  in  the  early  1960s  used 
diagrams  similar  to  Figure  6.  That  figure  depicts  a 
representative  micromarket  Phillips  curve,  the  exact 
replica  of  which  is  presumed  to  exist  in  each  local 
labor  market  and  aggregation  over  which  yields  the 
macro  Phillips  curve.  According  to  the  figure,  if  a 
given  national  unemployment  rate  U*  were  equally 
distributed  across  local  labor  markets  such  that  the 
same  rate  prevailed  in  each,  then  wages  everywhere 
would  inflate  at  the  single  rate  indicated  by  the  point 
w*  on  the  curve,  But  if  the  same  aggregate  unem- 
ployment  were  unequally  distributed  across  local 
markets,  then  wages  in  the  different  markets  would 
inflate  at  different  rates.  Because  of  the  curve’s 
convexity  (which  renders  wage  inflation  more  re- 
sponsive  to  leftward  than  to  rightward  deviations 
from  average  unemployment  along  the  curve)  the 
average  of  these  wage  inflation  rates  would  exceed 
the  rate  of  the  no-dispersion  case.  In  short,  the 
diagram  suggested  that,  for  any  given  aggregate 
unemployment  rate,  the  rate  of  aggregate  wage  infla- 
tion  varies  directly  with  the  dispersion  of  unemploy- 
ment  across  micromarkets,  thus  displacing  the  macro 
Phillips  curve  to  the  right. 
From  this  analysis,  economists  in  the  early  1960s 
concluded  that  the  greater  the  dispersion,  the  greater 
the  outward  shift  of the  aggregate  Phillips  curve.  To 
prevent  such  shifts,  the  authorities  were  advised  to 
apply  structural  policies  to  minimize  the  dispersion  of 
unemployment  across  industries,  regions,  and occu- 
pations.  Also,  they  were  advised  to  minimize  unem- 
ployment’s  dispersion  over  time  since,  with  a  convex 
Phillips  curve,  the  average  inflation  rate  would  be 
higher  the  more  unemployment  is  allowed  to  fluctuate 
around  its  average  (mean)  rate. 
A  Serious  Misspecification 
The  preceding  has  shown  how  shift  variables  were 
first  incorporated  into  the  Phillips  curve  in  the  early- 
to  mid-1960s.  Notably  absent  at  this  stage  were 
variables  representing  price  expectations.  To  be 
sure,  the  past  rate  of  price  change  was  sometimes 
used  as  a  shift  variable  to  represent  catch-up  or  cost- 
of-living  adjustment  factors  in  wage  and  price  de- 
mands.  Rarely,  however,  was  it  interpreted  as  a 
proxy  for  anticipated  inflation.  Not  until  the  late 
1960s  were  expectational  variables  fully  incorporated 
into  Phillips  curve  equations.  By  then,  of  course, 
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EFFECTS  OF  UNEMPLOYMENT 
DISPERSION 
w  Wage  Inflation  Rate 
If  aggregate  unemployment  at  rate U*  were 
evenly  distributed  across  individual  labor 
markets  such  that  the  same  rate  prevailed 
everywhere,  then  wages  would  inflate  at  the 
rate  w*  both  locally  and  nationally.  But  if 
aggregate  unemployment  U*  is  unequally 
distributed  such  that  rate UA  exists  in 
market A  and UB  in  market  B,  then  wages 
will  inflate  at  rate  WA  in the  former  market 
and  WB  in  the  latter.  The  average  of  these 
local  inflation  rates  at  aggregate  unemploy- 
ment  rate  U*  is  wo  which  is  higher  than 
inflation  rate  w*  of  the  no-dispersion  case. 
Conclusion:  The  greater  the  dispersion  of 
unemployment,  the  higher  the  aggregate 
inflation  rate  associated  with  any  given 
level  of  aggregate  unemployment.  Unem- 
ployment  dispersion  shifts  the  aggregate 
Phillips  curve  rightward. 
inflationary  expectations  had  become  too  prominent 
to  ignore  and  many  analysts  were  perceiving  them  as 
the  dominant  cause  of  observed  shifts  in  the  Phillips 
curve. 
Coinciding  with  this  perception  was  the  belated 
recognition  that  the  original  Phillips  curve  involved  a 
misspecification  that  could  only  be  corrected  by  the 
incorporation  of  a  price  expectations  variable  in  the 
trade-off.  The  original  Phillips  curve  was  expressed 
in  terms  of  nominal  wage  changes,  w=f(U).  Since 
neoclassical  economic  theory  teaches  that  real  rather 
than  nominal  wages  adjust  to  clear  labor  markets, 
however,  it  follows  that  the  Phillips  curve  should 
have  been  stated  in  terms  of  real  wage  changes. 
Better  still  (since  wage  bargains  are  made  with  an 
eye  to  the  future),  it  should  have  been  stated  in  terms 
of  expected  real  wage  changes,  i.e.,  the  differential 
between  the  rates  of  change  of  nominal  wages  and 
expected  future  prices,  w-pe=f(U).  In  short,  the 
original  Phillips  curve  required  a  price  expectations 
term  to  render  it  correct.  Recognition  of  this  fact 
led  to  the  development  of the  expectations-augmented 
Phillips  curve  described  below. 
Ill. 
THE  EXPECTATIONS-AUGMENTED  PHILLIPS  CURVE 
AND  THE  ADAPTIVE-EXPECTATIONS  MECHANISM 
The  original  Phillips  curve  equation  gave  way  to 
the  expectations-augmented  version  in  the  early 
1970s.  Three  innovations  ushered  in  this  change. 
The  first  was  the  respecification  of  the  excess  de- 
mand  variable.  Originally  defined  as  an  inverse 
function  of  the  unemployment  rate,  x(U),  excess 
demand  was  redefined  as  the  discrepancy  or  gap 
between  the  natural  and  actual  rates  of  unemploy- 
ment,  UN-U.  The  natural  (or  full  employment) 
rate  of  unemployment  itself  was  defined  as  the  rate 
that  prevails  in  steady-state  equilibrium  when  expec- 
tations  are  fully  realized  and  incorporated  into  all 
wages  and  prices  and  inflation  is  neither  accelerating 
nor  decelerating.  It  is  natural  in  the  sense  (1)  that 
it  represents  normal  full-employment  equilibrium  in 
the  labor  and  hence  commodity  markets,  (2)  that  it 
is  independent  of  the  steady-state  inflation  rate,  and 
(3)  that  it  is  determined  by  real  structural  forces 
(market  frictions  and  imperfections,  job  information 
and  labor  mobility  costs,  tax  laws,  unemployment 
subsidies,  and  the  like)  and  as  such  is  not  susceptible 
to  manipulation  by  aggregate  demand  policies. 
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price  anticipations  into  Phillips  curve  analysis  re- 
sulting  in  the  expectations-augmented  equation 
(3) p = a(UN-U)+pe 
where  excess  demand  is  now  written  as  the  gap 
between  the  natural  and  actual  unemployment  rates 
and  pe is  the  price  expectations  variable  representing 
the  anticipated  rate  of  inflation.  This  expectations 
variable  entered  the  equation  with  a  coefficient  of 
unity,  reflecting  the  assumption  that  price  expecta- 
tions  are  completely  incorporated  in  actual  price 
changes.  The  unit  expectations  coefficient  implies 
the  absence  of  money  illusion,  i.e.,  it  implies  that 
people  are  concerned  with  the  expected  real  purchas- 
ing  power  of  the  prices  they  pay  and  receive  (or, 
alternatively,  that  they  wish  to  maintain  their  prices 
relative  to  the  prices  they  expect  others  to  be  charg- 
ing)  and  so  take  anticipated  inflation  into  account. 
As  will  be  shown  later,  the  unit  expectations  coeffi- 
cient  also  implies  the  complete  absence  of  a  trade-off 
between  inflation  and  unemployment  in  long-run 
equilibrium  when  expectations  are  fully  realized. 
Note  also  that  the  expectations  variable  is  the  sole 
shift  variable  in  the  equation.  All  other  shift  vari- 
ables  have  been  omitted,  reflecting  the  view,  prevalent 
in  the  early  1970s  that  changing  price  expectations 
were  the  predominant  cause  of  observed  shifts  in 
the  Phillips  curve. 
Expectations-Generating  Mechanism 
The  third  innovation  was  the  incorporation  of  an 
expectations-generating  mechanism  into  Phillips 
curve  analysis  to  explain  how  the  price  expectations 
variable  itself  was  determined.  Generally  a  simple 
adaptive-expectations  or  error-learning  mechanism 
was  used.  According  to  this  mechanism,  expecta- 
tions  are  adjusted  (adapted)  by  some  fraction  of  the 
forecast  error  that  occurs  when  inflation  turns  out 
to  be  different  than  expected.  In  symbols, 
where  the  dot  over  the  price  expectations  variable 
indicates  the  rate  of  change  (time  derivative)  of  that 
variable,  p-pe  is  the  expectations  or  forecast  error 
(i.e.,  the  difference  between  actual  and  expected  price 
inflation),  and  b  is  the  adjustment  fraction.  Assum- 
ing,  for  example,  an  adjustment  fraction  of  ½,  equa- 
tion  4  says  that  if  the  actual  and  expected  rates  of 
inflation  are  10  percent  and  4  percent,  respectively- 
i.e.,  the  expectational  error  is  6  percent-then  the 
expected  rate  of  inflation  will  be  revised  upward  by 
an  amount  equal  to  half  the  error,  or  3  percentage 
points.  Such  revision  will  continue  until  the  expec- 
tational  error  is  eliminated. 
Analysts  also  demonstrated  that  equation  4  is 
equivalent  to  the  proposition  that  expected  inflation 
is  a  geometrically  declining  weighted  average  of  all 
past  rates  of  inflation  with  the  weights  summing  to 
one.  This  unit  sum  of  weights  ensures  that  any  con- 
stant  rate  of  inflation  eventually  will  be  fully  antici- 
pated,  as  can  be  seen  by  writing  the  error-learning 
mechanism  as 
where  indicates  the  operation  of  summing  the  past 
rates  of  inflation,  the  subscript  i  denotes  past  time 
periods,  and  vi  denotes  the  weights  attached  to  past 
rates  of  inflation.  With  a  stable  inflation  rate  p 
unchanging  over  time  and  a  unit  sum  of  weights,  the 
equation’s  right-hand  side  becomes  simply  p,  indi- 
cating  that  when  expectations  are  formulated  adap- 
tively  via  the  error-learning  scheme,  any  constant 
rate  of  inflation  will  indeed  eventually  be  fully  antici- 
pated.  Both  versions  of  the  adaptive-expectations 
mechanism  (i.e.,  equations  4  and  5)  were  combined 
with  the  expectations-augmented  Phillips  equation  to 
explain  the  mutual  interaction  of  actual  inflation, 
expected  inflation,  and  excess  demand. 
The  Natural  Rate  Hypothesis 
These  three  innovations-the  redefined  excess  de- 
mand  variable,  the  expectations-augmented  Phillips 
curve,  and  the  error-learning  mechanism-formed  the 
basis  of the  celebrated  natural  rate  and  accelerationist 
hypotheses  that  radically  altered  economists’  and 
policymakers’  views  of  the  Phillips  curve  in  the  late 
1960s  and  early  1970s.  According  to  the  natural 
rate  hypothesis,  there  exists  no  permanent  trade-off 
between  unemployment  and  inflation  since  real  eco- 
nomic  variables  tend  to  be  independent  of  nominal 
ones  in  steady-state  equilibrium.  To  be  sure,  trade- 
offs  may  exist  in  the  short  run.  For  example,  sur- 
prise  inflation,  if  unperceived  by  wage  earners,  may, 
by  raising  product  prices  relative  to  nominal  wages 
and  thus  lowering  real  wages,  stimulate  employment 
temporarily.  But  such  trade-offs  are  inherently 
transitory  phenomena  that  stem  from  unexpected 
inflation  and  that  vanish  once  expectations  (and  the 
wages  and  prices  embodying  them)  fully  adjust  to 
inflationary  experience.  In  the  long  run,  when  infla- 
tionary  surprises  disappear  and  expectations  are 
realized  such  that  wages  reestablish  their  preexist- 
ing  levels  relative  to  product  prices,  unemployment 
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is  compatible  with  all  fully  anticipated  steady-state 
rates  of  inflation,  implying  that  the  long-run  Phillips 
curve  is  a  vertical  line  at  the  natural  rate  of  unem- 
ployment. 
Equation  3 embodies  these  conclusions.  That  equa- 
tion,  when  rearranged  to  read  p-pe=a(UN-U), 
states  that  the  trade-off  is  between  unexpected  infla- 
tion  (the  difference  between  actual  and  expected 
inflation,  p-pe)  and  unemployment.  That  is,  only 
surprise  price  increases  could  induce  deviations  of 
unemployment  from  its  natural  rate.  The  equation 
also  says  that  the  trade-off  disappears  when  inflation 
is  fully  anticipated  (i.e.,  when  p-p”  equals  zero),  a 
result  guaranteed  for  any  steady  rate  of  inflation  by 
the  error-learning  mechanism’s  unit  sum  of  weights. 
Moreover,  according  to  the  equation,  the  right-hand 
side  must  also  be  zero  at  this  point,  which  implies 
that  unemployment  is  at  its  natural  rate.  The  natural 
rate  of  unemployment  is  therefore  compatible  with 
any  constant  rate  of  inflation  provided  it  is  fully 
anticipated  (which  it  eventually  must  be  by  virtue  of 
the  error-learning  weights  adding  to  one).  In  short, 
equation  3 asserts  that  inflation-unemployment  trade- 
offs  cannot  exist  when  inflation  is  fully  anticipated. 
And  equation  5  ensures  that  this  latter  condition 
must  obtain  for  all  steady  inflation  rates  such  that  the 
long-run  Phillips  curve  is  a vertical  line  at  the  natural 
rate  of  unemployment.2 
The  message  of  the  natural  rate  hypothesis  was 
clear.  A  higher  stable  rate  of  inflation  could  not 
buy  a  permanent  drop  in  joblessness.  Movements  to 
the  left  along  a  short-run  Phillips  curve  only  provoke 
expectational  wage/price  adjustments  that  shift  the 
curve  to  the  right  and  restore  unemployment  to  its 
natural  rate  (see  Figure  7).  In  sum,  Phillips  curve 
trade-offs  are  inherently  transitory  phenomena.  At- 
tempts  to  exploit  them  will  only  succeed  in  raising 
the  permanent  rate  of  inflation  without  accomplish- 
ing  a  lasting  reduction  in  the  unemployment  rate. 
2 Actually,  the  long-run  Phillips  curve  may  become  posi- 
tively  sloped  in  its  upper  ranges  as  higher  inflation  leads 
to  greater  inflation  variability  (volatility, 
unpredictability)  that  raises  the  natural 
rate  of  unemployment.  Higher  and 
hence  more  variable  and  erratic  infla- 
tion  can  raise  the  equilibrium  level  of 
unemployment  by  generating  increased 
uncertainty  that  inhibits  business  ac- 
tivity  and  by  introducing  noise  into  market  price  signals, 
thus  reducing  the  efficiency  of  the  price  system  as  a 
coordinating  and  allocating  mechanism. 
The  vertical  line  L  through  the  natural  rate 
of  unemployment  UN  is the  long-run  steady 
state  Phillips  curve  along  which  all  rates  of 
inflation  are  fully  anticipated.  The  down- 
ward-sloping  lines  are  short-run  Phillips 
curves  each  corresponding  to  a  different 
given  expected  rate  of  inflation.  Attempts 
to  lower  unemployment  from  the  natural 
rate  UN  to  U1  by  raising  inflation  to  3  per- 
cent  along  the  short-run  trade-off  curve  S0 
will  only  induce  shifts  in the  short-run  curve 
to  S1  S2,  S3  as  expectations  adjust  to  the 
higher  rate  of  inflation.  The  economy 
travels  the  path  ABCDE  to  the  new  steady 
state  equilibrium,  point  E,  where  unemploy- 
ment  is  at  its  preexisting  natural  rate  but 
inflation  is higher  than  it  was originally. 
The  Accelerationist  Hypothesis 
The  expectations-augmented  Phillips  curve,  when 
combined  with  the  error-learning  process,  also 
yielded  the  celebrated  accelerationist  hypothesis  that 
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1970s.  This  hypothesis,  a  corollary  of  the  natural 
rate  concept,  states  that  since  there  exists  no  long-run 
trade-off  between  unemployment  and  inflation,  at- 
tempts  to  peg  the  former  variable  below  its  natural 
(equilibrium)  level  must  produce  ever-increasing 
inflation.  Fueled  by  progressively  faster  monetary 
expansion,  such  price  acceleration  would  keep  actual 
inflation  always  running  ahead  of  expected  inflation, 
thereby  perpetuating  the  inflationary  surprises  that 
prevent  unemployment  from  returning  to  its  equilib- 
rium  level  (see  Figure  8). 
Accelerationists  reached  these  conclusions  via  the 
following  route.  They  noted  that  equation  3  posits 
that  unemployment  can  differ  from  its  natural  level 
only  so  long  as  actual  inflation  deviates  from  ex- 
pected  inflation.  But  that  same  equation  together 
with  equation  4  implies  that,  by  the  very  nature  of 
the  error-learning  mechanism,  such  deviations  cannot 
persist  unless  inflation  is  continually  accelerated  so 
that  it  always  stays  ahead  of  expected  inflation3  If 
inflation  is  not  accelerated,  but  instead  stays  con- 
stant,  then  the  gap  between  actual  and  expected 
inflation  will  eventually  be  closed.  Therefore  acceler- 
ation  is  required  to  keep  the  gap  open  if  unemploy- 
ment  is  to be  maintained  below  its  natural  equilibrium 
level.  In  other  words,  the  long-run  trade-off  implied 
by  the  accelerationist  hypothesis  is  between  unem- 
ployment  and  the  rate  of  acceleration  of  the  inflation 
rate,  in  contrast  to  the  conventional  trade-off  between 
unemployment  and  the  inflation  rate  itself  as  implied 
by  the  original  Phillips  curve.4 
Policy  Implications  of  the  Natural  Rate 
and  Accelerationist  Hypotheses 
At  least  two  policy  implications  stemmed  from  the 
natural  rate  and  accelerationist  propositions.  First, 
3 Taking  the  time  derivative  of  equation  3,  then  assuming 
that  the  deviation  of  U  from  UN  is  pegged  at  a  constant 
level  by  the  authorities  such  that  its  rate  of  change  is 
zero,  and  then  substituting  equation  4  into  the  resulting 
expression  yields 
which  says  that  the  inflation  rate  must  accelerate  to  stay 
ahead  of  expected  inflation. 
4 The  proof  is  simple.  Merely  substitute  equation  3  into 
the  expression  presented  in  the  preceding  footnote  to 
obtain 
which  says  that  the  trade-off  is  between  the  rate  of 
acceleration  of  inflation  and  unemployment  U  relative 
to  its  natural  rate. 
Figure  8 
THE  ACCELERATIONIST 
HYPOTHESIS 
Since  the  adjustment  of  expected  to  actual 
inflation  works  to  restore  unemployment  to 
its  natural  equilibrium  level  UN  at  any 
steady  rate  of  inflation,  the  authorities  must 
continually  raise  (accelerate)  the  inflation 
rate  if  they  wish  to  peg  unemployment  at 
some  arbitrarily  low  level  such  as U1.  Such 
acceleration,  by  generating  a  continuous 
succession  of  inflation  surprises,  perpetually 
frustrates  the  full  adjustment  of  expecta- 
tions  that  would  return  unemployment  to 
its  natural  rate.  Thus  attempts  to  peg 
unemployment  at  U1  will  provoke  explo- 
sive,  ever-accelerating  inflation.  The 
economy  will  travel  the  path  ABCD  with 
the  rate  of  inflation  rising  from  zero  to  p1 
to  p2  to  p3  etc. 
the  authorities  could  either  peg  unemployment  or 
stabilize  the  rate  of  inflation  but  not  both.  If  they 
pegged  unemployment,  they  would  lose  control  of 
the  rate  of  inflation  because  the  latter  accelerates 
when  unemployment  is  held  below  its  natural  level. 
Alternatively,  if  they  stabilized  the  inflation  rate, 
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latter  returns  to  its  natural  level  at  any  steady 
rate  of  inflation.  Thus,  contrary  to  the  original 
Phillips  hypothesis,  they  could  not  peg  unemployment 
at  a  given  constant  rate  of  inflation.  They  could, 
however,  choose  the  steady-state  inflation  rate  at 
which  unemployment  returns  to  its  natural  level. 
A  second  policy  implication  stemming  from  the 
natural  rate  hypothesis  was  that  the  authorities  could 
choose  from  among  alternative  transitional  adjust- 
ment  paths  to  the  desired  steady-state  rate  of  infla- 
tion.  Suppose  the  authorities  wished  to  move  from  a 
high  inherited  inflation  rate  to  a  zero  or  other  low 
target  inflation  rate.  To  do  so,  they  must  lower 
inflationary  expectations,  a  major  determinant  of  the 
inflation  rate.  But  equations  3  and  4  state  that  the 
only  way  to  lower  expectations  is  to  create  slack 
capacity  or  excess  supply  in  the  economy.  Such 
slack  raises  unemployment  above  its  natural  level  and 
thereby  causes  the  actual  rate  of  inflation  to  fall 
below  the  expected  rate  so  as  to  induce  a  downward 
revision  of  the  latter.5  The  equations  also  indicate 
that  how  fast  inflation  comes  down  depends  on  the 
amount  of  slack  created.6  Much  slack  means  fast 
adjustment  and  a  relatively  rapid  attainment  of  the 
inflation  target.  Conversely,  little  slack  means  slug- 
gish  adjustment  and  a  relatively  slow  attainment  of 
the  inflation  target.  Thus  the  policy  choice  is  between 
adjustment  paths  offering  high  excess  unemployment 
for  a  short  time  or  lower  excess  unemployment  for  a 
long  time  (see  Figure  9).7 
5 The  proof  is  straightforward.  Simply  substitute  equa- 
tion  3  into  equation  4  to  obtain 
=  ba(UN-U). 
This  expression  says  that  expectations  will  be  adjusted 
downward  (  will  be  negative)  only  if  unemployment 
exceeds  its  natural  rate. 
6 Note  that  the  equation  developed  in  footnote  4  states 
that  disinflation  will  occur  at  a  faster  pace  the  larger  the 
unemployment  gap. 
7 Controls  advocates  proposed  a  third  policy  choice:  use 
wage-price  controls  to  hold  actual  below  expected  infla- 
tion  so  as  to  force  a  swift  reduction  of  the  latter.  Over- 
looked  was  the  fact  that  controls  would  have  little  impact 
on  expectations  unless  the  public  was  convinced  that  the 
trend  of  prices  when  controls  were  in  force  was  a  reliable 
indicator  of  the  future  price  trend  after  controls  were 
lifted.  Convincing  the  public  would  be  difficult  if  controls 
had  failed  to  stop  inflation  in  the  past.  Aside  from  this, 
it  is  hard  to  see  why  controls  should  have  a  stronger 
impact  on  expectations  than  a  preannounced,  demon- 
strated  policy  of  disinflationary  money  growth. 
IV. 
STATISTICAL  TESTS OF  THE 
NATURAL  RATE  HYPOTHESIS 
The  preceding  has  examined  the  third  stage  of 
Phillips  curve  analysis  in  which  the  natural  rate  hy- 
pothesis  was  formed.  The  fourth  stage  involved 
statistical  testing  of  that  hypothesis.  These  tests, 
conducted  in  the  early-  to  mid-1970s,  led  to  criticisms 
of  the  adaptive-expectations  or  error-learning  model 
of  inflationary  expectations  and  thus  helped  prepare 
the  way  for  the  introduction  of  the  alternative 
rational  expectations  idea  into  Phillips  curve  analysis. 
The  tests  themselves  were  mainly  concerned  with 
estimating  the  numerical  value  of  the  coefficient  on 
the  price-expectations  variable  in  the  expectations- 
augmented  Phillips  curve  equation.  If  the  coefficient 
is  one,  as  in  equation  3, then  the  natural  rate  hypothe- 
sis  is  valid  and  no  long-run  inflation-unemployment 
trade-off  exists  for  the  policymakers  to  exploit.  But 
if  the  coefficient  is  less  than  one,  the  natural  rate 
hypothesis  is  refuted  and  a  long-run  trade-off 
exists.  Analysts  emphasized  this  fact  by  writing  the 
expectations-augmented  equation  as 
where ø  is  the  coefficient  (with  a  value  of  between 
zero  and  one)  attached  to  the  price  expectations  vari- 
able.  In  long-run  equilibrium,  of  course,  expected 
inflation  equals  actual  inflation,  i.e.,  pe=p.  Setting 
expected  inflation  equal  to  actual  inflation  as  required 
for  long-run  equilibrium  and  solving  for  the  actual 
rate  of  inflation  yields 
Besides  showing  that  the  long-run  Phillips  curve  is 
steeper  than  its  short-run  counterpart  (since  the  slope 
parameter  of  the  former,  a/(l-ø),  exceeds  that  of 
the  latter,  a),  equation  7 shows  that  a long-run  trade- 
off  exists  only  if  the  expectations  coefficient  ø  is  less 
than  one.  If  the  coefficient  is  one,  however,  the  slope 
term  is  infinite,  which  means  that  there  is  no  relation 
between  inflation  and  unemployment  so  that  the 
trade-off  vanishes  (see  Figure  10). 
Many  of  the  empirical  tests  estimated  the  coeffi- 
cient  to  be  less  than  unity  and  concluded  that  the 
natural  rate  hypothesis  was  invalid.  But  this  ‘con- 
clusion  was  sharply  challenged  by  economists  who 
contended  that  the  tests  contained  statistical  bias  that 
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ALTERNATIVE  DISINFLATION  PATHS 
ACB  =  Fast  disinflation  path  involving  high  ADEB  =  Gradualist  disinflation  path  involv- 
excess  unemployment  for  a short  ing  low  excess  unemployment  for 
time.  a  long  time. 
To  move  from  high-inflation  point  A  to  zero-inflation  point  B  the  authorities  must  first  travel 
along  short-run  Phillips  curve  SA,  lowering  actual  relative  to  expected  inflation  and,  thereby 
inducing  the  downward  revision  of  expectations  that  shifts  the  short-run  curve  Ieftward  until 
point  B  is  reached.  Since  the  speed  of  adjustment  of  expectations  depends  upon  the size  of 
the  unemployment  gap,  it  follows  that  point  B  will  be  reached  faster  via  the  high  excess  unem- 
ployment  path  ACB  than  via  the  low  excess  unemployment  path  ADEB.  Thechoice  is between 
high  excess  unemployment  for  a short  time  or  low  excess  unemployment  for  a  long  time. 
tended  to  work  against  the  natural  rate  hypothesis. 
These  critics  pointed  out  that  the  tests  typically  used 
adaptive-expectations  schemes  as  empirical  proxies 
for  the  unobservable  price  expectations  variable. 
They  further  showed  that  if  these  proxies  were  in- 
appropriate  measures  of  inflationary  expectations 
then  estimates  of  the  expectations  coefficient  could 
well  be  biased  downward.  If  so,  then  estimated  coeffi- 
cients  of  less  than  one  constituted  no  disproof  of  the 
natural  rate  hypothesis.  Rather  they  constituted  evi- 
dence  of  inadequate  measures  of  expectations. 
Shortcomings  of  the  Adaptive-Expectations 
Assumption 
In  connection  with  the  foregoing,  the  critics  argued 
that  the  adaptive-expectations  scheme  is  a  grossly 
inaccurate  representation  of  how  people  formulate 
price  expectations.  They  pointed  out  that  it  postu- 
lates  naive  expectational  behavior,  holding  as  it  does 
that  people  form  anticipations  solely  from  a  weighted 
average  of  past  price  experience  with  weights  that 
are  fixed  and  independent  of  economic  conditions  and 
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THE  EXPECTATIONS 
COEFFICIENT  AND  THE 
LONG-RUN  STEADY-STATE 
PHILLIPS  CURVE 
p  Price  inflation  Rate 
I  Long-run 
Phillips  Curve: 
Statistical  tests  of  the  natural  rate  hypo- 
thesis  sought  to  determine  the  magnitude 
of  the  expectations  coefficient  ø  in  the 
long run  steady-state  Phillips  curve  equation 
A  coefficient  of  one  means  that  no  perma- 
nent  trade-off  exists  and  the  steady-state 
Phillips  curve  is  a  vertical  line  through  the 
natural  rate  of  unemployment.  Conversely, 
a  coefficient  of  less  than  one  signifies  the 
existence  of  a  long-run  Phillips  curve  trade 
off  with  negative  slope  for  the  policymakers 
to  exploit.  Note  that  the  long run  curves 
are  steeper  than  the  short-run  ones,  indi- 
cating  that  permanent  trade-offs  are  less 
favorable  than  temporary  ones. 
policy  actions.  It  implies  that  people  look  only  at 
past  price  changes  and  ignore  all  other  pertinent 
information-e.g.,  money  growth  rate  changes,  ex- 
change  rate  movements,  announced  policy  intentions 
and  the  like-that  could  be  used  to  reduce  expecta- 
tional  errors.  That  people  would  fail  to  exploit  infor- 
mation  that  would  improve  expectational  accuracy 
seems  implausible,  however.  In  short,  the  critics 
contended  that  adaptive  expectations  are  not  wholly 
rational  if  other  information  besides  past  price 
changes  can  improve  inflation  predictions. 
Many  economists  have  since  pointed  out  that  it  is 
hard  to  accept  the  notion  that  individuals  would  con- 
tinually  form  price  anticipations  from  any  scheme 
that  is  inconsistent  with  the  way  inflation  is  actually 
generated  in  the  economy.  Being  different  from  the 
true  inflation-generating  mechanism,  such  schemes 
will  produce  expectations  that  are  systematically 
wrong.  If  so,  rational  forecasters  will  cease  to  use 
them.  For  example,  suppose  inflation  were  actually 
accelerating  or  decelerating.  According  to  equation  5, 
the  adaptive-expectations  model  would  systematically 
underestimate  the  inflation  rate  in  the  former  case 
and  overestimate  it  in  the  latter.  Using  a  unit 
weighted  average  of  past  inflation  rates  to  forecast  a 
steadily  rising  or  falling  rate  would  yield  a  succes- 
sion  of  one-way  errors.  The  discrepancy  between 
actual  and  expected  inflation  would  persist  in  a  per- 
fectly  predictable  way  such  that  forecasters  would 
be  provided  free  the  information  needed  to  correct 
their  mistakes.  Perceiving  these  persistent  expecta- 
tional  mistakes,  rational  individuals  would  quickly 
abandon  the  error-learning  model  for  more  accurate 
expectations-generating  schemes.  Once  again,  the 
adaptive-expectations  mechanism  is  implausible  be- 
cause  of  its  incompatibility  with  rational  behavior. 
V. 
FROM  ADAPTIVE  EXPECTATIONS  TO 
RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS 
The  shortcomings  of  the  adaptive-expectations 
approach  to  the  modeling  of  expectations  led  to  the 
incorporation  of  the  alternative  rational  expectations 
approach  into  Phillips  curve  analysis.  According  to 
the  rational  expectations  hypothesis,  individuals  will 
tend  to  exploit  all  available  pertinent  information 
about  the  inflationary  process  when  making  their 
price  forecasts.  If  true,  this  means  that  forecasting 
errors  ultimately  could  arise  only  from  random 
(unforeseen)  shocks  occurring  to  the  economy.  At 
first,  of  course,  price  forecasting  errors  might  also 
arise  because  individuals  initially  possess  limited  or 
incomplete  information  about,  say,  an  unprecedented 
new  policy  regime,  economic  structure,  or  inflation- 
generating  mechanism.  But  it  is  unlikely  that  this 
condition  would  persist.  For  if  the  public  were 
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tionary  surprises  or  prediction  errors  (data  on  which 
it  acquires  costlessly  as  a  side  condition  of  buying 
goods)  and  incorporate  the  free  new  information 
into  its  forecasting  procedures,  i.e.,  the  source  of 
forecasting  mistakes  would  be  swiftly  perceived  and 
systematically  eradicated.  As  knowledge  of  policy 
and  the  inflationary  process  improved,  forecasting 
models  would  be  continually  revised  to  produce  more 
accurate  predictions.  Soon  all  systematic  (predict- 
able)  elements  influencing  the  rate  of  inflation  would 
become  known  and  fully  understood,  and  individuals’ 
price  expectations  would  constitute  the  most  accu- 
rate  (unbiased)  forecast  consistent  with  that  knowl- 
edge.8  When  this  happened  the  economy  would  con- 
verge  to  its  rational  expectations  equilibrium  and 
people’s  price  expectations  would  be  the  same  as 
those  implied  by  the  actual  inflation-generating  mech- 
anism.  As  incorporated  in  natural  rate  Phillips  curve 
models,  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis  implies 
that  thereafter,  except  for  unavoidable  surprises  due 
to  purely  random  shocks,  price  expectations  would 
always  be  correct  and  the  economy  would  always  be 
at  its  long-run  steady-state  equilibrium. 
Policy  Implications  of  Rational  Expectations 
The  strict  (flexible  price,  instantaneous  market 
clearing)  rational  expectations  approach  has  radical 
policy  implications.  When  incorporated  into  natural 
rate  Phillips  curve  equations,  it  implies  that  system- 
atic  policies-i.e.,  those  based  on  feedback  control 
rules  defining  the  authorities’  response  to  changes  in 
the  economy-cannot  influence  real  variables  such  as 
output  and  unemployment  even  in  the  short  run, 
since  people  would  have  already  anticipated  what  the 
policies  are  going  to  be  and  acted  upon  those  antici- 
pations.  To  have  an  impact  on  output  and  employ- 
ment,  the  authorities  must  be  able  to  create  a  diver- 
gence  between  actual  and  expected  inflation.  This 
follows  from  the  proposition  that  inflation  influences 
real  variables  only  when  it  is  unanticipated.  To  lower 
unemployment  in  the  Phillips  curve  equation  p-pe= 
a(UN-U),  the  authorities  must  be  able  to  alter  the 
actual  rate  of inflation  without  simultaneously  causing 
an  identical  change  in  the  expected  future  rate.  This 
may  be  impossible  if  the  public  can  predict  policy 
actions. 
8  Put  differently,  rationality  implies  that  current  expecta- 
tional  errors  are  uncorrelated  with  past  errors  and  with 
all  other  known  information,  such  correlations  already 
having  been  perceived  and  exploited  in  the  process  of 
improving  price  forecasts. 
Policy  actions,  to  the  extent  they  are  systematic, 
are  predictable.  Systematic  policies  are  simply  feed- 
back  rules  or  response  functions  relating  policy  vari- 
ables  to  past  values  of  other  economic  variables. 
These  policy  response  functions  can  be  estimated  and 
incorporated  into  forecasters’  price  predictions.  In 
other  words,  rational  individuals  can  use  past  obser- 
vations  on  the  behavior  of  the  authorities  to  discover 
the  policy  rule.  Once  they  know  the  rule,  they  can 
use  current  observations  on  the  variables  to  which 
the  policymakers  respond  to  predict  future  policy 
moves.  Then,  on  the  basis  of  these  predictions,  they 
can  correct  for  the  effect  of  anticipated  policies  be- 
forehand  by  making  appropriate  adjustments  to  nomi- 
nal  wages  and  prices.  Consequently,  when  stabiliza- 
tion  actions  do  occur,  they  will  have  no  impact  on 
real  variables  like  unemployment  since  they  will  have 
been  discounted  and  neutralized  in  advance.  In  short, 
rules-based  policies,  being  in  the  information  set  used 
by  rational  forecasters,  will  be  perfectly  anticipated 
and  for  that  reason  will  have  no  impact  on  unemploy- 
ment.  The  only  conceivable  way  that  policy  can  have 
even  a  short-run  influence  on  real  variables  is  for  it 
to  be  unexpected,  i.e.,  the  policymakers  must  either 
act  in  an  unpredictable  random  fashion  or  secretly 
change  the  policy  rule.  Apart  from  such  tactics, 
which  are  incompatible  with  most  notions  of  the 
proper  conduct  of  public  policy,  there  is  no  way  the 
authorities  can  influence  real  variables,  i.e.,  cause 
them  to  deviate  from  their  natural  equilibrium  levels. 
The  authorities  can,  however,  influence  a  nominal 
variable,  namely  the  inflation  rate,  and  should  con- 
centrate  their  efforts  on  doing  so  if  some  particular 
rate  (e.g.,  zero)  is  desired. 
As  for  disinflation  strategy,  the  rational  expecta- 
tions  approach  generally  calls  for  a  preannounced 
sharp  swift  reduction  in  money  growth-provided  of 
course  that  the  government’s  commitment  to  ending 
inflation  is  sufficiently  credible  to  be  believed.  Hav- 
ing  chosen  a  zero  target  rate  of  inflation  and  having 
convinced  the  public  of their  determination  to  achieve 
it,  the  policy  authorities  should  be  able  to  do  so 
without  creating  a  costly  transitional  rise  in  unem- 
ployment.  For,  given  that  rational  expectations 
adjust  infinitely  faster  than  adaptive  expectations  to  a 
credible  preannounced  disinflationary  policy  (and 
also  that  wages  and  prices  adjust  to  clear  markets 
continuously)  the  transition  to  price  stability  should 
be  relatively  quick  and  painless  (see  Figure  11). 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK  OF  RICHMOND  17 Figure  11 
COSTLESS  DISINFLATION 
UNDER  RATIONAL 
EXPECTATIONS  AND 
POLICY  CREDIBILITY 
Assuming  expectational  rationality,  wage/ 
price  flexibility,  and  full  policy  credibility,  a 
preannounced  permanent  reduction  in 
money  growth  to  a  level  consistent  with 
Stable  prices  theoretically  lowers  expected 
and  thus  actual  inflation  to  zero  with  no 
accompanying  transitory  rise  in  unemploy- 
ment.  The  economy  moves  immediately  from 
point  A to  point  B on thevertical  steady-state 
Phillips  curve.  Here  is the  basic  prediction  of 
the  rational  expectations-natural  rate 
model:  that  fully  anticipated  policy  changes 
(including  credible  preannounced  ones) 
affect  only  inflation  but  not  output  and 
employment. 
natural  rate  Phillips  curve  models.  Under  adaptive- 
expectations,  short-run  trade-offs  exist  because  such 
expectations,  being  backward  looking  and  slow  to 
respond,  do  not  adjust  instantaneously  to  elimi- 
nate  forecast  errors  arising  from  policy-engineered 
changes  in  the  inflation  rate.  With  expectations 
adapting  to  actual  inflation  with  a  lag,  monetary 
policy  can  generate  unexpected  inflation  and  conse- 
quently  influence  real  variables  in  the  short  run.  This 
cannot  happen  under  rational  expectations  where 
both  actual  and  expected  inflation  adjust  identically 
and  instantaneously  to  anticipated  policy  changes. 
In  short,  under  rational  expectations,  systematic 
policy  cannot  induce  the  expectational  errors  that 
generate  short-run  Phillips  curves.9  Phillips  curves 
may  exist,  to  be  sure.  But  they  are  purely  adventi- 
tious  phenomena  that  are  entirely  the  result  of  unpre- 
dictable  random  shocks  and  cannot  be  exploited  by 
policies  based  upon  rules. 
In  sum,  no  role  remains  for  systematic  counter- 
cyclical  stabilization  policy  in  Phillips  curve  models 
embodying  rational  expectations  and  the  natural  rate 
hypothesis.  The  only  thing  such  policy  can  influ- 
ence  in  these  models  is  the  rate  of  inflation  which 
adjusts  immediately  to  expected  changes  in  money 
growth.  Since  the  models  teach  that  the  full  effect 
of  rules-based  policies  is  on  the  inflation  rate,  it 
follows  that  the  authorities-provided  they  believe 
that  the  models  are  at  all  an  accurate  representation 
of  the  way  the  world  works-should  concentrate 
their  efforts  on  controlling  that  nominal  inflation 
variable  since  they  cannot  systematically  influence 
real  variables.  These  propositions  are  demonstrated 
with  the  aid  of  the  expository  model  presented  in  the 
Appendix  on  page  21. 
VI. 
EVALUATION  OF  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS 
The  preceding  has  shown  how  the  rational  expec- 
tations  assumption  combines  with  the  natural  rate 
hypothesis  to  yield  the  policy-ineffectiveness  conclu- 
sion  that  no  Phillips  curves  exist  for  policy  to  exploit 
No  Exploitable  Trade-Offs 
To  summarize,  the  rationality  hypothesis,  in  con- 
junction  with  the  natural  rate  hypothesis,  denies  the 
existence  of  exploitable  Phillips  curve  trade-offs  in 
the  short  run  as  well  as  the  long.  In  so  doing,  it 
differs  from  the  adaptive-expectations  version  of 
9 Note  that  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis  also  rules 
out  the  accelerationist  notion  of  a  stable trade-off  between 
unemployment  and  the  rate  of  acceleration  of  the  inflation 
rate.  If  expectations  are  formed  consistently  with  the 
way  inflation  is  actually  generated,  the  authorities  will 
not  be  able  to  fool  people  by  accelerating  inflation  or  by 
accelerating  the  rate  of  acceleration.  etc.  Indeed.  no 
systematic-policy  will  work  if  expectations  are  formed 
consistently  with  the  way  inflation  is  actually  generated 
in  the  economy. 
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pothesis  is  that  it  treats  expectations  formation  as  a 
part  of  optimizing  behavior.  By  so  doing,  it  brings 
the  theory  of  price  anticipations  into  accord  with  the 
rest  of  economic  analysis.  The  latter  assumes  that 
people  behave  as  rational  optimizers  in  the  production 
even  in  the  short  run.  Given  the  importance  of  the 
rational  expectations  component  in  modern  Phillips 
curve  analysis,  an  evaluation  of  that  component  is 
now  in  order. 
and  purchase  of  goods,  in  the  choice  of  jobs,  and  in 
the  making  of  investment  decisions.  For  consistency, 
it  should  assume  the  same  regarding  expectational 
behavior. 
In  this  sense,  the  rational  expectations  theory  is 
superior  to  rival  explanations,  all  of which  imply  that 
expectations  may  be  consistently  wrong.  It  is  the 
only  theory  that  denies  that  people  make  systematic 
expectation  errors.  Note  that  it  does  not  claim  that 
people  possess  perfect  foresight  or  that  their  expec- 
tations  are  always  accurate.  What  it  does  claim  is 
that  they  perceive  and  eliminate  regularities  in  their 
forecasting  mistakes.  In  this  way  they  discover  the 
actual  inflation  generating  process  and  use  it  in  form- 
ing  price  expectations.  And  with  the  public’s  rational 
expectations  of  inflation  being  the  same  as  the  mean 
value  of the  inflation  generating  process,  those  expec- 
tations  cannot  be  wrong  on  average.  Any  errors  will 
be  random,  not  systematic.  The  same  cannot  be  said 
for  other  expectations  schemes,  however.  Not  being 
identical  to  the  expected  value  of  the  true  inflation 
generating  process,  those  schemes  will  produce  biased 
expectations  that  are  systematically  wrong. 
expectations  are  basically  nonrational,  i.e.,  that  most 
people  are  too  naive  or  uninformed  to  formulate  un- 
biased  price  expectations.  Overlooked  is  the  coun- 
terargument  that  relatively  uninformed  people  often 
delegate  the  responsibility  for  formulating  rational 
forecasts  to  informed  specialists  and  that  professional 
forecasters,  either  through  their  ability  to  sell  supe- 
rior  forecasts  or  to  act  in  behalf  of  those  without 
same,  will  ensure  that  the  economy  will  behave  as  if 
all  people  were  rational.  One  can  also  note  that  the 
rational  expectations  hypothesis  is  merely  an  impli- 
cation  of  the  uncontroversial  assumption  of  profit 
(and  utility)  maximization  and  that,  in  any  case, 
economic  analysis  can  hardly  proceed  without  the 
rationality  assumption.  Other  critics  insist,  however, 
that  expectational  rationality  cannot  hold  during  the 
transition  to  new  policy  regimes  or  other  structural 
changes  in  the  economy  since  it  requires  a  long  time 
to  understand  such  changes  and  learn  to  adjust  to 
them.  Against  this  is  the  counterargument  that  such 
changes  and  their  effects  are  often  foreseeable  from 
the  economic  and  political  events  that  precede  them 
and  that  people  can  quickly  learn  to  predict  regime 
changes  just  as  they  learn  to  predict  the  workings  of a 
given  regime.  This  is  especially  so  when  regime 
changes  have  occurred  in  the  past.  Having  experi- 
enced  such  changes,  forecasters  will  be  sensitive  to 
their  likely  future  occurrence. 
Biased  expectations  schemes  are  difficult  to  justify 
theoretically.  Systematic  mistakes  are  harder  to 
explain  than  is  rational  behavior.  True,  nobody 
really  knows  how  expectations  are  actually  formed. 
But  a  theory  that  says  that  forecasters  do  not  con- 
tinually  make  the  same  mistakes  seems  intuitively 
more  plausible  than  theories  that  imply  the  opposite. 
Considering  the  profits  to  be  made  from  improved 
forecasts,  it  seems  inconceivable  that  systematic  ex- 
pectational  errors  would  persist.  Somebody  would 
surely  notice  the  errors,  correct  them,  and  profit  by 
the  corrections.  Together,  the  profit  motive  and 
competition  would  reduce  forecasting  errors  to  ran- 
domness. 
Most  of  the  criticism,  however,  is  directed  not  at 
the  rationality  assumption  per  se  but  rather  at 
another  key  assumption  underlying  its  policy- 
ineffectiveness  result,  namely  the  assumption  of  no 
policymaker  information  or  maneuverability  advan- 
tage  over  the  private  sector.  This  assumption  states 
that  private  forecasters  possess  exactly  the  same 
information  and  the  ability  to  act  upon  it  as  do  the 
authorities.  Critics  hold  that  this  assumption  is  im- 
plausible  and  that  if  it  is  violated  then  the  policy 
ineffectiveness  result  ceases  to  hold.  In  this  case,  an 
exploitable  short-run  Phillips  curve  reemerges,  allow- 
ing  some  limited  scope  for  systematic  monetary  poli- 
cies  to  reduce  unemployment. 
Criticisms  of  the  Rational  Expectations 
Approach 
For  example,  suppose  the  authorities  possess  more 
and  better  information  than  the  public.  Having  this 
information  advantage,  they  can  predict  and  hence 
respond  to  events  seen  as  purely  random  by  the 
public.  These  policy  responses  will,  since  they  are 
unforeseen  by  the  public,  affect  actual  but  not  ex- 
pected  inflation  and  thereby  change  unemployment 
relative  to  its  natural  rate  in  the  (inverted)  Phillips 
curve  equation  UN-U=(l/a)(p-pe). 
Despite  its  logic,  the  rational  expectations  hypothe-  Alternatively,  suppose  that  both  the  authorities 
sis  still  has  many  critics.  Some  still  maintain  that  and  the  public  possess  identical  information  but  that 
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tractual  obligations  from  exploiting  that  information. 
For  example,  suppose  workers  and  employers  make 
labor  contracts  that  fix  nominal  wages  for  a  longer 
period  of  time  than  the  authorities  require  to  change 
the  money  stock.  With  nominal  wages  fixed  and 
prices  responding  to  money,  the  authorities  are  in  a 
position  to  lower  real  wages  and  thereby  stimulate 
employment  with  an  inflationary  monetary  policy. 
In  these  ways,  contractual  and  informational  con- 
straints  are  alleged  to  create  output-  and  employment- 
stimulating  opportunities  for  systematic  stabilization 
policies.  Indeed,  critics  have  tried  to  demonstrate  as 
much  by  incorporating  such  constraints  into  rational 
expectations  Phillips  curve  models  similar  to  the  one 
outlined  in  the  Appendix  of  this  article. 
Proponents  of  the  rational  expectations  approach, 
however,  doubt  that  such  constraints  can  restore  the 
potency  of  activist  policies  and  generate  exploitable 
Phillips  curves.  They  contend  that  policymaker 
information  advantages  cannot  long  exist  when  gov- 
ernment  statistics  are  published  immediately  upon 
collection,  when  people  have  wide  access  to  data 
through  the  news  media  and  private  data  services, 
and  when  even  secret  policy  changes  can  be  pre- 
dicted  from  preceding  observable  (and  obvious) 
economic  and  political  pressures.  Likewise,  they 
note that  fixed  contracts  permit  monetary  policy  to 
have  real  effects  only  if  those  effects  are  so  inconse- 
quential  as  to  provide  no  incentive  to  renegotiate 
existing  contracts  or  to  change  the  optimal  type  of 
contract  that  is  negotiated.  And  even  then,  they  note, 
such  monetary  changes  become  ineffective  when  the 
contracts  expire.  More  precisely,  they  question  the 
whole  idea  of fixed  contracts  that  underlies  the  sticky 
wage  case  for  policy  activism.  They  point  out  that 
contract  duration  is  not  invariant  to  the  type  of  policy 
being  pursued  but  rather  varies  with  it  and  thus 
provides  a  weak  basis  for  activist  fine-tuning. 
Finally,  they  insist  that  such  policies,  even  if  effec- 
tive,  are  inappropriate.  In  their  view,  the  proper  role 
for  policy  is  not  to  exploit  informational  and  con- 
tractual  constraints  to  systematically  influence  real 
activity  but  rather  to  neutralize  the  constraints  or  to 
minimize  the  costs  of  adhering  to  them.  Thus  if 
people  form  biased  price  forecasts,  then  the  policy- 
makers  should  publish  unbiased  forecasts.  And  if  the 
policy  authorities  have  informational  advantages  over 
private  individuals,  they  should  make  that  informa- 
tion  public  rather  than  attempting  to  exploit  the  ad- 
vantage.  That  is,  if  information  is  costly  to  collect 
and  process,  then  the  central  authority  should  gather 
it  and  make  it  freely  available.  Finally,  if  contractual 
wages  and  prices  are  sticky  and  costly  to  adjust,  then 
the  authorities  should  minimize  these  price  adjust- 
ment  costs  by  following  policies  that  stabilize  the 
general  price  level. 
In  short,  advocates  of  the  rational  expectations 
approach  argue  that  feasibility  alone  constitutes  in- 
sufficient  justification  for  activist  policies.  Policies 
should  also  be  socially  beneficial.  Activist  policies 
hardly  satisfy  this  latter  criterion  since  their  effective- 
ness  is  based  on  deceiving  people  into  making  expec- 
tational  errors.  The  proper  role  for  policy  is  not  to 
influence  real  activity  via  deception  but  rather  to 
reduce  information  deficiencies,  to  eliminate  erratic 
variations  of  the  variables  under  the  policymakers’ 
control,  and  perhaps  also  to  minimize  the  costs  of 
adjusting  prices. 
VII. 
CONCLUDING  COMMENTS 
The  preceding  paragraphs  have  traced  the  evolu- 
tion  of  Phillips  curve  analysis.  The  chief  conclusions 
can  be  stated  succinctly.  The  Phillips  curve  concept 
has  changed  radically  over  the  past  25  years  as  the 
notion  of  a  stable  enduring  trade-off  has  given  way 
to  the  policy-ineffectiveness  view  that  no  such  trade- 
off  exists  for  the  policymakers  to  exploit.  Instru- 
mental  to  this  change  were  the  natural  rate  and 
rational  expectations  hypotheses,  respectively.  The 
former  says  that  trade-offs  arise  solely  from  expec- 
tational  errors  while  the  latter  holds  that  systematic 
macroeconomic  stabilization  policies,  by  virtue  of 
their  very  predictability,  cannot  possibly  generate 
such  errors.  Taken  together,  the  two  hypotheses 
imply  that  systematic  demand  management  policies 
are  incapable  of  influencing  real  activity,  contrary  to 
the  predictions  of  the  original  Phillips  curve  analysis. 
On  the  positive  side,  the  two  hypotheses  do  imply 
that  the  government  can  contribute  to  economic  sta- 
bility  by  following  policies  to  minimize  the  expecta- 
tional  errors  that  cause  output  and  employment  to 
deviate  from  their  normal  full-capacity  levels.  For 
example,  the  authorities  could  stabilize  the  price  level 
so  as  to  eliminate  the  surprise  inflation  that  generates 
confusion  between  absolute  and  relative  prices  and 
that  leads  to  perception  errors.  Similarly,  they  could 
direct  their  efforts  at  minimizing  random  and  erratic 
variations  in  the  monetary  variables  under  their  con- 
trol.  In  so  doing,  not  only  would  they  lessen  the 
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from  output’s  natural  rate,  they  would  reduce  policy 
uncertainty  as  well. 
Besides  the  above,  the  natural  rate-rational  expec- 
tations  school  also  notes  that  microeconomic  struc- 
tural  policies  can  be  used  to  achieve  what  macro 
demand  policies  cannot,  namely  a  permanent  reduc- 
tion  in  the  unemployment  rate.  For,  by  improving 
the  efficiency  and  performance  of  labor  and  product 
markets,  such  micro  policies  can  lower  the  natural 
rate  of  unemployment  and  shift  the  vertical  Phillips 
curve  to  the  left.  A  similar  argument  was  advanced 
in  the  early  1960s  by  those  who  advocated  structural 
policies  to  shift  the  Phillips  curve.  It  is  on  this 
point,  therefore,  that  one  should  look  for  agreement 
between  those  who  still  affirm  and  those  who  deny 
the  existence  of  exploitable  inflation-unemployment 
trade-offs. 
APPENDIX 
A  SIMPLE  ILLUSTRATIVE  MODEL 
The  policy  ineffectiveness  proposition  discussed  in 
Section  V  of the  text  can  be  clarified  with  the  aid  of a 
simple  illustrative  model.  The  model  consists  of  four 
components,  namely  an  (inverted)  expectations- 
augmented  Phillips  curve 
(1)  UN-U  =  (l/a)(p-pe), 
a  monetarist  inflation-generating  mechanism 
(2)  p  =  m+ 
a  policy  reaction  function  or  feedback  control  rule 
(3) m  =  c(U-1-UT)-d(p-l-pT)+µ, 
and  a  definition  of  rational  inflation  expectations 
(4) pe  =  E[p¦I]. 
Here  U  and  UN  are  the  actual  and  natural  rates  of 
unemployment,  p and  pe the  actual  and  expected  rates 
of  inflation,  m  the  rate  of  nominal  monetary  growth 
per  unit  of  real  money  demand  (the  latter  assumed 
to  be  a  fixed  constant  except  for  transitory  disturb- 
ances),  and µ  are  random  error  terms  with  mean 
values  of  zero,  E  is  the  expectations  operator,  I  de- 
notes  all  information  available  when  expectations  are 
formed,  and  the  subscripts  T  and  -1  denote  target 
and  previous  period  values  of  the  attached  variables. 
Of  these  four  equations,  the  first  expresses  a trade- 
off  between  unemployment  (relative  to  its  natural 
level)  and  surprise  (unexpected)  inflation.l  Equa- 
tion  2  expresses  the  rate  of  inflation  p  as  the  sum  of 
1 There  exists  a  current  dispute  over  the  proper  inter- 
pretation  of  the  Phillips  curve  equation  1.  The  rational 
expectations  literature  interprets  it  as  an  aggregate 
supply  function  stating  that  firms  produce  the  normal 
capacity  level  of  output  when  actual  and  expected  infla- 
tion  are  equal  but  produce  in  excess  of  that  level  (thus 
pushing  U  below  U,)  when  fooled  by  unexpected  infla- 
tion.  This  view  holds  that  firms  mistake  unanticipated 
general  price  increases  for  rises  in  the  particular  (rela- 
tive)  prices  of  their  own  products.  Surprised  by  inflation, 
the  growth  rate  of  (demand  adjusted)  money  m 
and  a  random  shock  variable  having  a  mean  (ex- 
pected)  value  of  zero.  In  essence,  this  equation  says 
that  inflation  is  generated  by  excess  money  growth 
and  transitory  disturbances  unrelated  to  money 
growth.  Equation  3  says  that  the  policy  authorities 
set  the  current  rate  of  monetary  growth  in  an  effort 
to  correct  last  period’s  deviations  of  the  unemploy- 
ment  and  inflation  rates  from  their  predetermined 
target  levels,  UT  and  PT.  Also,  since  money  growth 
cannot  be  controlled  perfectly  by  the  feedback  rule, 
the  slippage  is  denoted  by  the  random  variable  µ 
with  a  mean  of  zero  that  causes  money  growth  to 
deviate  unpredictably  from  the  path  intended  by  the 
authorities.  Note  that  the  disturbance  term µ can 
also  represent  deliberate  monetary  surprises  engi- 
neered  by  the  policy  authorities.  Finally,  the  last 
equation  defines  anticipated  inflation  pe as  the  mathe- 
matical  expectation  of  the  actual  inflation  rate  con- 
ditional  on  all  information  available  when  the  expec- 
tation  is  formed.  Included  in  the  set  of  available 
information  are  the  inflation-generating  mechanism, 
the  policy  reaction  function,  and  the  values  of  all 
past  and  predetermined  variables  in  the  model. 
To  derive  the  policy  ineffectiveness  result,  first 
calculate  mathematical  expectations  of  equations  2 
and  3.  Remembering  that  the  expected  values  of  the 
random  terms  in  those  equations  are  zero,  this  step 
yields  the  expressions 
they  treat  the  price  increase  as  special  to  themselves  and 
so  expand  output.  An  alternative  interpretation  views 
the  equation  as  a  price-setting  relation  according  to  which 
businessmen,  desiring  to  maintain  their  constant-market- 
share  relative  prices,  raise  their  prices  at  the  rate  at  which 
they  expect  other  businessmen  to  be  raising  theirs  and 
then  adjust  that  rate  upward  if  demand  pressure  appears. 
Either  interpretation  yields  the  same  result:  expecta- 
tional  errors  cause  output  and  unemployment  to  deviate 
from  their  natural  levels.  The  deviations  disappear  when 
the  errors  vanish. 
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(6)  me  =  c(U-1-UT)-d(p-1-pT) 
which  state  that,  under  rational  expectations  and 
systematic  feedback  policy  rules,  the  anticipated 
future  rate  of  inflation  equals  the  expected  rate  of 
monetary  growth  which  in  turn  is  given  by  the  deter- 
ministic  (known)  component  of  the  monetary  policy 
rule.  The  last  step  is  to  substitute  equations  2,  3,  5, 
and  6  into  equation  1  to  obtain  the  reduced  form 
expression 
which  states  that  deviations  of  unemployment  from 
its  natural  rate  result  solely  from  inflation  surprises 
caused  by  random  shocks. 
To  see  the  policy  ineffectiveness  result,  note  that 
only  the  unsystematic  or  unexpected  random  com- 
ponent  of  monetary  policy,  m-me=µ,  enters  the 
the  reduced  form  equation.2  The  systematic  com- 
2 Note  that  both  the  monetary-surprise  equation  m-me=µ 
and  the  price-surprise  equation  p-pe=  embody  the 
famous  orthogonality  property  according  to  which  fore- 
cast  errors  m-me  and  p-pe  are  independent  of  (ortho- 
gonal  to)  all  information  available  when  the  forecast  is 
made.  In  particular,  the  forecast  errors  are  independent 
of  the  past  and  predetermined  values  of  all  variables  and 
of  the  systematic  components  of  the  policy  rule  and 
inflation-generating  mechanism.  This  is  as  it  should  be. 
For  if  the  errors  were  not  independent  of  the  foregoing 
variables,  then  information  is  not  being  fully  exploited 
and  expectations  are  not  rational. 
ponent  is  absent.  This  means  that  systematic  (rules- 
based)  monetary  policies  cannot  affect  the  unemploy- 
ment  rate.  Only  unexpected  money  growth  matters. 
No  Phillips  curve  trade-offs  exist  for  systematic 
policy  to  exploit.3 
To  summarize,  the  strict  (flexible  price,  continuous 
market  clearing)  rational  expectations-natural  rate 
model  depicted  here  implies  that  expectational  errors 
are  the  only  source  of  departure  from  steady-state 
equilibrium,  that  such  errors  are  random,  short-lived, 
and  immune  to  systematic  policy  manipulation,  and 
therefore  that  rules-based  policies  can  have  no  impact 
on  real  variables  like  unemployment  since  those 
policies  will  be  fully  foreseen  and  allowed  for  in 
wage/price  adjustments.  Thus,  except  for  unpre- 
dictable  random  shocks,  steady-state  equilibrium  pre- 
vails  and  systematic  monetary  changes  produce  no 
surprises,  no  disappointed  expectations,  no  transitory 
impacts  on  real  economic  variables.  In  short,  Phillips 
curves  are  totally  adventitious  phenomena  generated 
by  unforeseeable  random  shocks  and  as  such  cannot 
be  exploited  by  systematic  policy  even  in  the  short 
run. 
3 Of  course  random  policy  could  affect  output.  That  is, 
the  authorities  could  influence  real  activity  by  manipu- 
lating  the  disturbance  term µ  in  the  policy  reaction  func- 
tion  in  a  haphazard  unpredictable  way.  Randomness, 
however,  is  not  a  proper  basis  for  public  policy. 
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